


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29 March 1960 25X1




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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 6 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

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State Department review completed

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29 MARCH 1960

# I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev offers "nothing new" so far in talks with De Gaulle.

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

New Delhi continues its support to Tibetan resistance leaders in India.


Indonesia--Communist influence enlarged in new parliament appointed by Sukarno; some military and civilian elements oppose it.

South African official says union will leave UN if riots issue is inscribed on Security Council agenda.

New political grouping in Kenya foreshadows increased pressure for independence.

British Somaliland--Local government to demand independence for 1 July.

Other French African areas likely to follow up quickly on Madagascar's lead for independence.



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 March 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-France: [French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville told the American ambassador in Paris on 25 March that the first series of talks between Khrushchev and De Gaulle could be summed up in two words: "Nothing new."] 25X1

25X1

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

India-Tibet: [The Indian Government, while officially dissociating itself from the Tibetan resistance movement, continues to give limited support to its leaders in India.] 25X1

OK- [In addition, he has apparently made no effort to force postponement of a nonofficial Asian-African convention on Tibet which is scheduled to be held in New Delhi 8-11 April, ten days before Chou En-lai's arrival] 25X1

OK 25X1 Indonesia: Differences between President Sukarno and the army over the composition of the new parliament, which was announced 27 March, are reported sharp and unresolved. Communist and extreme leftist membership in the new body, which Sukarno envisages as a rubber-stamp legislature, may amount to as much as 25 percent of the total. Some military and civilian elements continue to press the army leadership to take action against Sukarno.

NO South Africa: [A high official in the South African Ministry of External Affairs has told the American ambassador that if the issue of the recent riots is inscribed on the Security Council's agenda, South Africa will have no choice but to leave the UN. The Security Council is likely to inscribe the issue on its] 25X1

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[agenda at the 30 March meeting. The African bloc is pressing for a strong condemnatory resolution, while key Western members are advocating some type of investigative machinery which would keep the UN involved with race relations without specifically condemning South Africa.]

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\*The work stoppage on 28 March has led to serious rioting in the Johannesburg and Cape Town areas. Police have been evacuated from several African townships in the Johannesburg vicinity, but they remain in control outside the immediate native areas.

25X1

*DK*  
Kenya: [Inauguration of the Kenya African National Union party--a coalition of various nationalist groups--foreshadows increased pressure for independence and could transfer control of the independence movement to irresponsible elements. Establishment of the new party was only reluctantly supported by Tom Mboya, who probably recognizes it as a threat to his leadership. Statements by party spokesmen that recent African constitutional gains are only steps toward full independence, together with the Mau Mau connections of some of its leaders, appear certain to increase apprehension among Kenya's Europeans.]

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*N<sup>o</sup>*  
British Somaliland: [British hopes for a period of three years to prepare the Somaliland Protectorate for independence are unlikely to be realized. The local government, controlled by representatives of the UAR-supported nationalists who recently won an overwhelming electoral victory, will demand in early April that London agree to the protectorate's independence in time for union with Somalia on 1 July.]

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(Page 6)

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*N<sup>o</sup>*  
French Africa: The success of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) in negotiating its independence without sacrificing French aid and membership in the French Community virtually assures early requests for "international sovereignty"

29 Mar 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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from other autonomous Community states. Paris' reported insistence on the maintenance of political and strategic solidarity with France probably will not immediately trouble the present pro-French regimes in most of these states. However, this requirement is apparently causing difficulties in the negotiations which representatives of the Mali Federation have been conducting in Paris since mid-January. [REDACTED]  
(Map)

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29 Mar 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii


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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indian Government Continues to Support Tibetan  
Resistance Movement

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(Nehru apparently has made no effort to force postponement  
of the nonofficial Asian-African convention on Tibet, even though)

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[the anti-Chinese rally is scheduled to be held in New Delhi only ten days before Chou En-lai's arrival on 19 April. In February, when the international convention was first scheduled, Nehru had persuaded Indian Socialist leaders to put off the meeting in order to avoid antagonizing Peiping. Although New Delhi has officially dissociated the government from the convention, Nehru may feel that such a demonstration of Indian public opinion, backed by representatives from other Asian countries, will strengthen his hand in presenting India's case to the Chinese premier.]

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Indonesian Army Has Not Challenged New Parliament

Differences between the army and President Sukarno over the composition of the new parliament, which was announced 27 March, are reported sharp and unresolved. Communist and far leftist membership in the new body, which Sukarno personally appointed and which he envisages as a rubber-stamp legislature, may amount to as much as 25 percent. Although the new parliament actually may have little governing function, it will offer the Communists a privileged platform from which to expound ideas and permit the reproduction of these ideas through mass media.

The army leadership has given no indication that it plans to move against Sukarno at this time. Parliament is not scheduled to be installed until early June, when Sukarno returns from his round-the-world tour, and some action may be under consideration to prevent or postpone installation.

During Sukarno's absence, civilian and military elements can be expected to intensify pressure on Army Chief of Staff and Security Minister General Nasution for some anti-Sukarno move. Civilian pressures will be channeled through the new organization recently formed by the large anti-Communist Masjumi and several small parties, the Democratic League, which is poorly represented in the new parliament. Junior officer groups, dissatisfied for various reasons, may attempt to use the parliamentary issue to crystallize anti-Djakarta feelings, and further armed incidents, similar to the 19 March attack on an army school in Bandung, could occur. [REDACTED]

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South Africa Threatens to Leave UN

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[A high official in the South African Ministry of External Affairs has told the American ambassador that if the question of the recent riots in the Union is inscribed on the UN Security Council's agenda, South Africa will have no choice but to withdraw from the UN. In 1955 South Africa withdrew its delegation from the General Assembly on the grounds that UN discussion of its apartheid policy was in violation of Charter provisions which forbid UN interference in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state. In the 1954, 1956, 1958, and 1959 sessions the Union refused to participate in the assembly's discussion of the apartheid issue but did participate in other assembly matters. This is the first time the Union's policies have faced Security Council action.]

[The Security Council is likely to inscribe the issue at its 30 March meeting. The African bloc is pressing for a strong condemnatory resolution, while key Western members are advocating some type of investigative machinery which would keep the UN involved with the country's race relations without specifically condemning South African internal affairs.]

[In the Union, meanwhile, the one-day work stoppage on 28 March, sponsored by the African National Congress (ANC) as a memorial for the Africans killed last Monday, resulted in serious rioting in the Johannesburg and Cape Town areas. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), a militant African group whose demonstrations touched off the riots on 21 March but which had disassociated itself from the 28 March strike, reportedly instructed its members to join the ANC demonstrators. Police were evacuated from several Johannesburg African townships, and the townships have been sealed off. South African security forces remain in control outside the native areas.]

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Kenya Africans Form New Party

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[The inauguration on 27 March of the Kenya African National Union (KANU)--a coalition of leading nationalist groups--appears to presage stepped-up agitation for independence in the British colony. The new party, dissatisfied with agreements reached in London last January providing for increased African representation in Kenya's legislature and cabinet, is pledged to work for immediate and full independence. A resolution disavowing the London agreements was voted down by KANU, but the party described the new constitution as a transitional step toward "immediate" independence.]

[Establishment of KANU represents a threat to the political leadership of Tom Mboya, who was a leader of the African delegation to London and is associated with the London agreements in the public mind. Mboya appears not to have been consulted in the party's formative stage, and his appearance at the inaugural rally as a member of its constitutional committee brought a mixed reaction from African spectators present.]

[The inauguration of KANU appears likely to increase apprehension among Europeans in Kenya, many of whom have already made preparations to sell their holdings in anticipation of African rule. Its demands will serve to dramatize the accelerated pace of African independence activity, while the Mau Mau connections of some of its members--including Chairman James Gichuru--will inspire widespread uneasiness.]

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Somali Nationalists Increasing Pressure

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[Nationalists in Britain's Somaliland Protectorate are increasing their pressure to gain the early independence of this area and its union with the Italian trust territory of Somalia when the latter obtains independence on 1 July. The nationalists, who control the protectorate's ministerial council and legislature, plan to have the legislature request London on 6 April to grant independence by July.]

[The British governor's efforts to point out the difficulties that will arise from the early departure of British civil servants and the border tension with Ethiopia have been unsuccessful. The governor hopes, however, that the Somalis may adopt a more moderate attitude after a proposed visit by protectorate leaders to Mogadiscio and may go along with Britain's plan for slower political evolution. While Mogadiscio leaders officially espouse a union of all Somali tribesmen in a Greater Somalia state, actually many of them fear that such a union would increase the strength of tribes opposing the present government.]


[Unfulfilled Somali nationalist demands may lead to disorders in the next few months in the protectorate, as well as cause growing Ethiopian apprehension of suspected British backing for Somali expansion.]

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Most, if not all, of the 11 autonomous states of the French Community appear headed for early independence following the success of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) in negotiating its "international sovereignty" without sacrificing French economic aid. The negotiations, along with similar talks still in progress involving the Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan, have been watched as a possible model by the remaining Community states.

Under the agreement, announced in Paris on 26 March and expected to be implemented this summer, the Malagasy Republic will continue to be a member of the Community, which now is to be transformed into something akin to the Commonwealth. Changes in the De Gaulle Constitution necessary to make the new arrangement possible are expected to be presented to the French National Assembly when it convenes next month.

[A French Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on the eve of the Paris announcement that, in addition to the Malagasy Republic and Mali, the four Community states in equatorial Africa (Gabon, Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic) would become independent as a unit this year and that the Ivory Coast and possibly Mauritania would attain similar status. He said negotiations would begin next with the equatorial Africans who recently reached agreement--apparently with French encouragement--to establish a loose confederation.]

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Paris' requirement--revealed by Premier Debré last fall--that independent Community states demonstrate real political and strategic solidarity with France probably will not immediately trouble most of the generally pro-French regimes now in power throughout the Community. Apparently, however, it has already caused difficulties in the Mali talks. Mali's leaders--the most nationalistically inclined of present African leaders of Community states--were recently reported to be resisting French demands for assurances of support in the UN and for retention of control over the naval base at Dakar. [REDACTED]

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

### The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

### The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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### The Department of Commerce

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### Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

### National Security Agency

The Director

### National Intelligence Center

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